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FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
Reconciling Theory and
Doctrine in First Amendment
Jurisprudence
Robert Post
The twentieth century has seen the birth and development of the doc-
trine of the First Amendment's free speech clause. In its current state, free-
speech jurisprudence is hampered by coexisting but conflicting First
Amendment theories and doctrines. In this Essay, Professor Post examines
these conflicts. He traces the development of two primary First Amendment
theories: the theory of the marketplace of ideas, exemplified by Justice
Holmes' dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States; and the theory of
democratic speech, articulated most notably by Alexander Meiklejohn.
After discussing the doctrinal implications of these theories and noting that
courts have not followed either theory consistently, Professor Post sug-
gests that First Amendment jurisprudence could be rendered more coher-
ent if First Amendment theories were to be ordered according to a "lexical
priority" that will illuminate what is at stake in the conflict between theo-
ries and how such conflicts may be settled.
INTRODUCTION
The simple and absolute words of the First Amendment float atop a
tumultuous doctrinal sea. The free speech jurisprudence of the First
Amendment is notorious for its flagrantly proliferating and contradictory
rules, its profoundly chaotic collection of methods and theories.' Yet,
strange to say, those fluent in the law of free speech can predict with
reasonable accuracy the outcomes of most constitutional cases. It seems
that what is amiss with First Amendment doctrine is not so much the
absence of common ground about how communication within our society
ought constitutionally to be ordered, as it is our inability to formulate clear
explanations and coherent rules capable of elucidating and charting the
contours of this ground.
First Amendment doctrine veers between theory and the exigencies of
specific cases. The function of doctrine is both to implement the objectives
1. See generally Glen 0. Robinson, The Electronic First Amendment: An Essay for the New
Age, 899 DuKE L.J. 966 (1998); Frederick Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v.
Ferber, 1982 Sup. Cr. REv. 285.
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attributed by theory to the Constitution and to offer principled grounds of
justification for particular decisions. Doctrine becomes confused when the
requirements of theory make little sense in the actual circumstances of
concrete cases, or when doctrine is required to articulate the implications
of inconsistent theories. First Amendment doctrine has unfortunately suf-
fered from both these difficulties.
In a remarkable series of opinions in 1919, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes virtually invented both First Amendment theory and First
Amendment doctrine. He advanced the theory of the marketplace of ideas,
and he demonstrated how doctrine would have to evolve to correspond to
this new theory. Soon thereafter, however, the Court articulated a compet-
ing and in some respects inconsistent theory, which focused on the practice
of democratic self-government. In this Essay, I examine each of these two
theories of the First Amendment to illustrate the complex ways in which
theory, doctrine, and common sense interact in First Amendment jurispru-
dence. My objective is to explore the sources of the current disarray of
First Amendment doctrine and to assess the kinds of clarification that we
may reasonably anticipate from an analytically rigorous First Amendment
jurisprudence.
I
LAYING THE GROUNDWORK: JUSTICE HOLMES' LANDMARK OPINIONS
Although First Amendment law did not spring into existence ex nihilo
in the year 1919,2 First Amendment jurisprudence as we now know it
springs from a series of profoundly influential opinions by Oliver Wendell
Holmes in the spring and fall of that year. The first of these opinions,
Schenck v. United States,' is the origin of the famous "clear and present
danger" test.
The defendants in Schenck were charged with violating the Espionage
Act of 19174 by, among other things, "causing and attempting to cause
insubordination.., in the military... and to obstruct the recruiting and
enlistment service of the United States, when the United States was at war
with the German Empire."5 The defendants were prosecuted for circulating
to draftees a leaflet opposing conscription; their defense was that the leaflet
was "protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution."6
2. See DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 23 (1997) (tracing the
origins of contemporary First Amendment doctrine).
3. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
4. Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219 (repealed 1948).




Holmes' opinion for the Court firmly rejected this defense, but it did
so without any discussion of the distinctive purposes or policies of the First
Amendment. Instead Holmes reasoned:
It seems to be admitted that if an actual obstruction of the
recruiting service were proved, liability for words that produced
that effect might be enforced .... If the act, (speaking, or
circulating a paper,) its tendency and the intent with which it is
done are the same, we perceive no ground for saying that success
alone warrants making the act a crime.7
Holmes argued that because obstruction of the draft constitutionally could
be punished, so could the crime of attempted obstruction. He explained
that when performed with the appropriate intent, the act of speaking
or writing could constitute the crime of attempt if, as a matter of
"proximity and degree," the "tendency" of the communication was to
cause the punishable act of obstructing the draft! Holmes also added that,
"[t]he question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a
right to prevent."9 But the meaning of the novel phrase "clear and present
danger" was obscure. It was clarified by Holmes' opinion for the Court in
Debs v. United States,"0 which held that speech merely had to have the
"natural tendency and reasonably probable effect" ' of obstructing the
recruiting service in order to constitute a punishable attempt to violate the
Espionage Act of 1917.12
Holmes' logic in both Schenck and Debs remained entirely within the
domain of substantive criminal law. Speech that was connected in a suffi-
ciently close way to a crime was equivalent to an attempt to commit
the crime. The closeness of the connection was to be assessed by doctrinal
tests of "proximity and degree," tests rooted in the substantive law
of attempt. 3 Although in some circumstances the First Amendment might
7. Il at 52.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. 249U.S. 211 (1919). Schenckwas decided on March 3, 1919; Debs on March 10, 1919.
11. Id. at216.
12. In Debs, the Court unanimously sustained the conviction of prominent socialist politician
Eugene Debs for violating the Espionage Act of 1917 by attempting "to obstruct the recruiting and
enlistment service of the United States." Id. at 212. The evidence of the crime consisted entirely of a
non-inflammatory speech opposing World War I at a Socialists' convention. Holmes wrote:
ITihe jury were most carefully instructed that they could not find the defendant guilty for
advocacy of any of his opinions unless the words used had as their natural tendency and
reasonably probable effect to obstruct the recruiting service, &c., and unless the defendant
had the specific intent to do so in his mind.
Id. at 216.
13. For good discussions of the relationship between the clear and present danger test and the
substantive law of attempt, see Edward J. Bloustein, Criminal Attempts and the "Clear and Present
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safeguard speech-circumstances that Holmes did not explore-the
Constitution did not protect speech so intimately bound up in action as to
constitute the crime of attempt as defined by principles of the criminal law.
Eight months after Schenck, the Court was confronted with Abrams v.
United States,4 a case that involved a prosecution under the Espionage Act
of 1918.' This Act was quite different from its 1917 predecessor. Tracking
the words of the 1918 Act, the indictment at issue in Abrams charged the
defendants with publishing:
[i]n the first count, "disloyal, scurrilous and abusive language about
the form of Government of the United States;" in the second count,
language "intended to bring the form of Government of the United
States into contempt, scorn, contumely and disrepute;" and in the
third count, language "intended to incite, provoke and encourage
resistance to the United States in said war." The charge in the
fourth count was that the defendants conspired "when the United
States was at war with the Imperial German Government, ....
unlawfully and willfully, by utterance, writing, printing and
publication, to urge, incite and advocate curtailment of production
of things and products ... necessary and essential to the
prosecution of the war."'6
The defendants in Abrams raised strenuous constitutional objections to
these charges. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Clarke disposed of these
objections to their convictions by simple reference to Schenck." In fact,
however, the prosecutions in Abrams posed entirely distinct First
Amendment questions from those presented in Schenck, questions that
would push Holmes fundamentally to revise the logic of his earlier opin-
ions.
The Espionage Act of 1917 had prohibited action-obstructing the
recruitment service of the United States during wartime. For this reason,
Schenck was written to address the question of when speech could be char-
acterized as a form of proscribed action. The Espionage Act of 1918, in
contrast, prohibited language itself. In particular, counts one and two of the
Abrams indictment, which essentially charged the common law crime of
seditious libel, sought to punish speech for reasons that bore no relation-
ship to action at all. The logic of Schenck was therefore quite irrelevant to
these counts. It made no sense to ask whether language "intended to bring
the form of Government of the United States ... into contempt" had the
Danger" Theory of the First Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. Rv. 1118 (1989); G. Edward White, Justice
Holmes and the Modernization of Free Speech Jurisprudence: The Human Dimension, 80 CALIF. L.
REv. 391 (1992).
14. 250 U.S. 616 (1919). The Court decided Abrams on November 10, 1919.
15. Espionage Act of May 16, 1918, ch. 75,40 Stat. 553 (repealed 1921).
16. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 617.
17. See id. at 619.
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"natural tendency and reasonably probable effect" of causing some under-
lying evil that Congress had independently forbidden. The expression of
such language was itself the evil that Congress wished to suppress.
Holmes immediately understood this difference. He realized that the
Court was now forced, as it had not been forced in Schenck, to address the
question of whether the First Amendment would permit the suppression
of seditious libel. Holmes' answer was unequivocal: "I wholly, disagree
with the argument of the Government that the First Amendment left the
common law as to seditious libel in force."' 8 This is the precise point in
American constitutional history when First Amendment theory enters into
the construction of First Amendment doctrine, for Holmes' bold assertion
required him to explain why the First Amendment prohibited the punish-
ment of seditious libel.
Seditious libel is a quintessentially political crime; its purpose is to
protect the "special veneration... due" to those who rule. 9 Holmes could
therefore have offered a theory of the First Amendment that derived from
the particular characteristics of American democracy, from the fact that, as
Madison put it, in our form of government "the censorial power is in the
people over the Government, and not in the Government over the
people."2 But Holmes chose not to elaborate a political conception of the
First Amendment. Instead, he proposed the now-famous theory of the mar-
ketplace of ideas:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the
very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
18. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). This was a new position for Holmes. Twelve years before,
he had written that the "main purpose" of the First Amendment was "'to prevent all such previous
restraints upon publications as had been practiced by other governments,"' and that the First
Amendment consequently did "not prevent the subsequent punishment of such as may be deemed
contrary to the public welfare.... The preliminary freedom extends as well to the false as to the true;
the subsequent punishment may extend as well to the true as to the false." Patterson v. Colorado, 205
U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (citations omitted). There is some evidence that by the time of Schenck Holmes
was beginning to rethink this position. For example, he wrote in Schenclc
It well may be that the prohibition of laws abridging the freedom of speech is not confined to
previous restraints, although to prevent them may have been the main purpose, as intimated
in Patterson v. Colorado. We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants
in saying all that was said in the circular would have been within their constitutional rights.
Schenck, 249 U.S. at 51-52 (citation omitted). For a recent discussion of Holmes' famous change of
mind, see Bradley C. Bobertz, The Brandeis Gambit: The Making of America's "First Freedom,"
1909-1931,40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 557,587-607 (1999).
19. FRANcIs LUDLOW HOLT, THE LAW OF LIBEL 90 (1816). For a good explication, see 2 JAMES
FITZJAMES STEPHENS, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 299-300 (1883).
20. 4 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 934 (1794). This is the logic that the Court adopted almost 50 years
later when it finally ruled that the First Amendment did indeed forbid the punishment of seditious libel.
See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,275 (1964).
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competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon
which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the
theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an
experiment.... While that experiment is part of our system I think
that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the
expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with
death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference
with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate
check is required to save the country.2'
Holmes' Abrams dissent is sometimes interpreted as representing an
economic view of freedom of speech, as though the metaphors of "free
trade in ideas" and "the competition of the market" meant that the consti-
tutional value of freedom of speech literally entailed the maximization of
consumer preferences. 22 But in Abrams Holmes explicitly oriented his the-
ory of the First Amendment toward the value of truth, which he linked to
the concept of "experiment." This strongly suggests that the Abrams dis-
sent is best understood as an expression of American pragmatic
epistemology, with which Holmes was very familiar.23 Pragmatists like
William James were prone to using economic metaphors to capture the
idea that truth must be experimentally determined from the properties of
experience itself.24 One could understand Holmes, then, as claiming that
the property of experience relevant to the determination of the truth of po-
litical opinion is that democratic citizens come to believe in an idea and to
act on it.
The difficulty with this interpretation, however, is that Holmes
phrased his argument in terms of an account of truth generally, rather
than of specifically political truth. In the spirit of the liberal philosophical
position of John Stuart Mill,'s Holmes proposed a theory of the First
Amendment addressed to the abstract requirements of freedom of thought.
As Holmes would write in a subsequent dissent: "[I]f there is any principle
of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any
other it is the principle of free thought-not free thought for those who
agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate. 26
21. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
22. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT
172-76 (1999).
23. See Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 788 (1989).
24. Thus James wrote: "Pragmatism... asks its usual question. 'Grant an idea or belief to be
true,' it says, 'what concrete difference will its being true make in any one's actual life?... What
experiences will be different from those which would obtain if the belief were false? What, in short, is
the truth's cash-value in experiential terms?' WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM: A NEw NAME FOR SOME
OLD WAYS OF THINKING 200 (1908).
25. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publishing Co. 1978)
(1859).
26. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644,654-55 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Holmes' dissent in Abrams contains the first judicial expression of a
theory of the First Amendment, and the theory had immediate and power-
ful doctrinal consequences. Counts three and four of the Abrams indict-
ment alleged the publication of language directed to producing certain
actions-resisting the United States' prosecution of the war and curtailing
the production of necessary war material. It was clear that these actions
could be made criminal, and Holmes' earlier opinions in Schenck
and Debs had explicitly held that language having the tendency to produce
crimes and spoken with the specific intent to produce crimes could
be punished as attempts to commit crimes. One could characterize the
Espionage Act of 1918 as a legislative judgment that speech advocating or
encouraging prohibitable actions would have the tendency to produce those
actions. Given the generous and elastic breadth of the "bad tendency" test
Holmes had himself articulated and applied in Debs, this legislative judg-
ment was no doubt reasonable It was thus only a small step for the Court
to hold that this language could constitutionally be punished under Schenck
and Debs.
Counts three and four of the Abrams indictment thus directly forced
Holmes to evaluate the relationship between his new theory of the First
Amendment and the doctrinal test he had himself previously announced.
Holmes immediately realized that if speech could be suppressed merely
because it tended to produce prohibited action, the marketplace of ideas
could easily be savaged by state regulation?' In an admirable effort to
reshape First Amendment doctrine to implement the purposes of First
Amendment theory, therefore, Holmes fundamentally transformed the bad
tendency test of Debs and Schenck. He reinterpreted the "clear and present
danger" requirement to require a showing of imminence. Holmes argued in
Abrams that even if speech could be characterized by substantive criminal
27. In fact in 1925 Justice Sanford cleverly traded on this logic to uphold the criminal anarchy
statute of New York. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). Like the Espionage Act of 1918,
the New York criminal anarchy statute prohibited language that was connected to certain harms. In the
case of the New York statute, the harms were those of violent revolution. Sanford reasoned that the
statute constituted a legislative "determination" that speech advocating violent revolution posed "a
sufficient danger of substantive evil" to be regulated, and he shrewdly argued that, as Holmes and
Brandeis had contended in other cases, legislative judgments in such matters ought be "given great
weight." Id. at 668-70. Sanford observed that such legislative judgments posed an "entirely different"
question "from that involved in those cases where the statute merely prohibits certain acts involving the
danger of substantive evil, without any reference to language itself, and it is sought to apply its
provisions to language used by the defendant for the purpose of bringing about the prohibited results."
Id. at 670-71. In the latter case, Sanford conceded, courts must independently determine whether a
defendant's language "involved such likelihood of bringing about the substantive evil as to deprive it of
the constitutional protection." Id. at 671. But, he concluded, the test of "natural tendency and probable
effect" set forth in Schenck and Debs "has no application.., where the legislative body itself has
previously determined the danger of substantive evil arising from utterances of a specified character."
Id.
28. As Holmes remarked: "Congress certainly cannot forbid all effort to change the mind of the
country" Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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law as an "attempt," the First Amendment should nevertheless prohibit its
punishment unless there were an "emergency," unless "the expression of
opinions... so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful
and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to
save the country." 29
By tightening the constitutionally required connection between speech
and action in this way, Holmes sought both to provide ample room for the
functioning of the marketplace of ideas and to empower the state to regu-
late speech when it was sufficiently close to causing prohibitable substan-
tive evils. Demonstrating the seriousness of his new test, Holmes
concluded that the Abrams defendants could not constitutionally be
convicted because "nobody can suppose that the surreptitious publishing
of a silly leaflet by an unknown man, without more, would present any
immediate danger that its opinions would hinder the success of the
government arms ....
The path of Holmes' development from Schenck to Abrams exempli-
fies the dialectical relationship between First Amendment doctrine and
First Amendment theory. As he refined his understanding of the purposes
of the First Amendment, Holmes was forced to revise and reshape the
doctrinal tests he had himself announced only months before. This is
because Holmes fully appreciated that the purpose of doctrine is to institu-
tionalize constitutional objectives. A corollary of this insight, however, is
that First Amendment doctrine will suffer if it is expected to serve con-
flicting or inconsistent objectives.
The potential for this problem materialized shortly after Holmes'
Abrams dissent. In one of its very first decisions striking down a state
regulation of speech, the Court in 1931 articulated a specifically political
account of the First Amendment that was quite distinct from the market-
place of ideas. "The maintenance of the opportunity for free political
discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the
people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means," the Court said,
"is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system."'"
The democratic theory of the First Amendment differs in important
respects from the marketplace of ideas theory, most notably because the
former protects speech insofar as it is required by the practice of self-
government, while the latter protects speech insofar as it is required to
facilitate the pursuit of truth. To the extent that the practice of self-
government serves ends distinct from and potentially inconsistent with the
pursuit of truth, and to the extent that the pursuit of truth entails practices
inconsistent with self-government, these two theories diverge. Both
29. Id. at 630.
30. Id. at 628.
31. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
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theories have nevertheless remained influential in the Court's thinking. The
Court can announce both that "'[it is the purpose of the First Amendment
to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will
ultimately prevail,' ' 32 and that the objective of the First Amendment is to
function as the "guardian of our democracy." 3 Almost from its inception,
First Amendment doctrine has been caught in the crossfire between these
two theories of freedom of speech.
To explore this contested terrain, we need to have some concrete idea
of the practical differences between these two distinct perspectives. The
next Part of this Essay evaluates the theory of the marketplace of ideas,
with particular attention to the tension between its doctrinal development
and the actual shape of our First Amendment tradition. Part III discusses
the ambiguities and implications of the democratic theory, while the fourth
and final Part compares the doctrinal implications of the two theories and
attempts to draw some general conclusions about the relationship between
First Amendment theory and doctrine.
II
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
The theory of the marketplace of ideas focuses on "the truth-seeking
function"' of the First Amendment. It extends the shelter of constitutional
protection to speech so that we can better understand the world in which
we live. It would follow from the theory, therefore, that at a minimum the
Constitution ought to be concerned with all communication conveying
ideas relevant to our understanding the world, whether or not these ideas
are political in nature. This does not mean, of course, that the Constitution
would prohibit all regulation of such communication. But it does imply
that regulation of such communication ought to be evaluated according to
the constitutional standards of the theory.
This is in fact the way that contemporary First Amendment doc-
trine defines the range of communication that triggers First Amendment
scrutiny. The so-called Spence test, for example, holds that the First
Amendment will come "into play" whenever "'an intent to convey a
particularized message [is] present,"' and, given the context, "'the
likelihood [is] great that the message would be understood by those who
viewed it."'35 This broad doctrinal rule uses the potential communication of
ideas to define what will count as "speech" for purposes of the First
32. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 507 U.S. 1301, 1304 (1993) (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)); see also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 341
(1995); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46,52,56 (1988).
33. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45,60 (1982).
34. Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 52.




Amendment. It thus crisply expresses the principle that the regulation of
any communication capable of increasing understanding must be subjected
to constitutional review.
While this principle follows more or less directly from the theory of
the marketplace of ideas, it does not in fact correspond to the common
sense of judges, as expressed in the resolution of actual cases. Much
behavior that passes the Spence test because it successfully communicates
a particularized message is not regarded as bringing the First Amendment
into play. Such conduct ranges from terrorist bombings to written warnings
on consumer products.36 It is not that regulation of this conduct is affirma-
tively permitted by the First Amendment; it is rather that courts do not
even subject such regulation to First Amendment scrutiny. When measured
by the actual shape of the law, therefore, it is immediately apparent that the
Spence test, which defines speech in a manner that follows from the theory
of the marketplace of ideas, simply cannot stand.37
First Amendment jurisprudence is filled with analogous disparities
between actual decisions and doctrinal rules that would appear to follow
from the theory of the marketplace of ideas. For example, it is black-letter
law that the First Amendment applies "the most exacting scrutiny to
regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens
upon speech because of its content."'38 Such a rule would seem to express
the requirement that the state remain neutral within the marketplace of
ideas, for it is formulated in such a way as to apply not merely to political
speech, but to the entire range of "speech" as defined by the Spence test.
Yet content-based regulation of speech is routinely enforced without spe-
cial constitutional scrutiny, as for example when lawyers or doctors
are held liable in professional malpractice for the communication of irre-
sponsible opinions.39 Or consider the black-letter rule that "[t]he First
Amendment recognizes no such thing as a 'false' idea."40 This rule also
seems to express a central value of the marketplace of ideas, and it is
accordingly also said to apply generally to "speech," and not merely to
political speech. Yet "false" ideas can be regulated not only in the context
of professional malpractice, but also in the context of commercial speech,
where speakers can be sanctioned if they communicate in ways that are
"misleading."4'
36. For a typical consumer product warning case, see Hahn v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 805 F.2d 1480
(I lth Cir. 1986).
37. For a full discussion of the inadequacy of the Spence test, see Robert Post, Recuperating
First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. Rav. 1249, 1250-60 (1995).
38. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
39. See, e.g., Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1980); Carson v.
City of Beloit, 145 N.W.2d 112 (Wis. 1966).
40. Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 51.
41. See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476,482 (1995).
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There is thus a disturbingly large gap between the actual shape of our
constitutional law and doctrinal rules that seem to express the theory of the
marketplace of ideas. This gap suggests either that we do not believe in the
theory of the marketplace of ideas, or that our doctrine has somehow mis-
construed the actual implications of the theory. The latter alternative seems
to me the more plausible. Although First Amendment doctrine presently
understands "the truth-seeking function" of the marketplace of ideas
to flow directly from the communicative properties of speech, in fact
"truth-seeking" requires much more. It requires an important set of shared
social practices: the capacity to listen and to engage in self-evaluation, as
well as a commitment to the conventions of reason, which in turn entail
aspirations toward objectivity, disinterest, civility, and mutual respect.
Thus John Dewey once remarked that rational deliberation depends upon
"the possibility of conducting disputes, controversies and conflicts as
cooperative undertakings in which both parties learn by giving the other a
chance to express itself," and that this cooperation is inconsistent with one
party conquering another "by forceful suppression ... a suppression which
is none the less one of violence when it takes place by psychological
means of ridicule, abuse, intimidation, instead of by overt imprisonment or
in concentration camps."42
The social practices necessary for a marketplace of ideas to serve a
"truth-seeking function" are perhaps most explicitly embodied in the cul-
ture of scholarship inculcated in universities and professional academic
disciplines. Certainly this culture is what Charles Peirce had in mind when
he advocated "the method of science" as a preferred avenue toward truth, a
method that he explicitly contrasted with the "method of authority" which
employs the "organized force" of the state to suppress "liberty of speech."43
In this limited sense there is deep insight in the Court's often repeated
observation that "[tihe college classroom with its surrounding environs is
peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas."'" The augmentation of knowledge
within professional academic disciplines does not flow merely from the
fact that ideas are formally free from official censorship, but rather from
the fact that this freedom is embedded within what John Stuart Mill once
42. John Dewey, Creative Democracy-The Task Before Us, reprinted in CLASSIC AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHERS 389, 393 (Max H. Fisch ed., 1951).
43. CHARLES S. PEIRCE, The Fixation of Belief, in VALUES IN A UNIVERSE OF CHANCE 91, 110-
11 (Philip P. Wiener ed., 1958). It is likely that Holmes was exposed to this essay while he was a
member of the Metaphysical Club. See David S. Bogen, The Free Speech Metamorphosis of Mr.
Justice Holmes, 11 HOFSTRA L. REv. 97, 120 (1982).
44. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972); see, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267
n.5 (1981); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969). In another
sense, however, the Court's observation is fundamentally inaccurate, for the classroom itself represents
a managerial domain dedicated to instruction, rather than to the open-ended pursuit of knowledge. See
Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY. L. REv. 267,
317-25 (1990). The marketplace of ideas most exactly applies to the enterprise of scholarship itself.
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called a "real morality of public discussion."45 In the absence of such a
morality, it is merely tautological to presume that truth is what most people
come to believe after open discussion.46
It is thus inaccurate to infer that the theory of the marketplace of ideas
requires that the First Amendment protect all speech that communicates
ideas. Instead the theory requires the protection only of speech that com-
municates ideas and that is embedded in the kinds of social practices that
produce truth.47 The Court's failure to offer doctrinal articulation of the
social prerequisites of truth-seeking is a significant source of the gap
between doctrinal rules attempting to embody the theory of the market-
place of ideas and the actual shape of our First Amendment law.
Society consists of myriad forms of social practices, and speech is
constitutive of almost all of these practices. The number of these practices
that can plausibly be rendered consistent with the "truth-seeking function"
of a marketplace of ideas is relatively small. It makes no sense, for exam-
ple, to locate a "truth-seeking function" in the speech between lawyers or
doctors and their clients, or in the communication contained in product
warning labels. Judges recognize this distinction; their common sense reb-
els against applying to such situations doctrinal rules based upon com-
pletely incompatible social presuppositions. That is why First Amendment
doctrine differs from the actual shape of our law.
To implement accurately the theory of the marketplace of ideas, there-
fore, doctrinal rules would have to confine the scope of their application to
those domains of social life where the prerequisite forms of social organi-
zation for a functioning marketplace of ideas either were present or could
constitutionally be conjured into existence. Exactly where the theory could
appropriately be applied, of course, would be highly debatable, but I sus-
pect that under any fair construction the scope of its application would be
quite narrow.
Ell
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND DEMOcRATIC SELF-GOVERNMENT
If the theory of the marketplace of ideas tends to efface the social
practices by which it is in fact sustained, thereby inducing a free-floating
image of pure communication, the democratic theory has not suffered any
such liability. It has never been subject to the same mystification as has the
marketplace of ideas. We instantly recognize self-government as a discrete
45. MILL, supra note 25, at 52.
46. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 20 (1982).
47. I have argued elsewhere that any function attributed to the First Amendment will require a
form of social organization in order to accomplish its ends, and that the Court's tendency to formulate
rules applicable to speech itself, independent of social organization, has for this reason been a major
source of doctrinal confusion within First Amendment law. See Post, supra note 37.
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and embodied social practice, and for this reason courts applying demo-
cratic theory have been clear that the First Amendment protects only
speech pertinent to self-determination. Thus, for example, in the important
early decision of Thornhill v. Alabama,48 the Court asserted that because
freedom of speech was essential to "the maintenance of democratic institu-
tions," it embraced "the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters
of public concern" so that "members of society" could "cope with the
exigencies of their period."'49
Democratic theory, however, has been subject to its own ambiguities.
The constitutional meaning of self-government has proved intensely con-
troversial. It is, of course, generally agreed that democracy subsists in the
people governing themselves, but historically there have been two com-
peting accounts of the practice of self-determination, each with different
implications for First Amendment doctrine.
One account, associated with the work of Alexander Meiklejohn,
views democracy as a process of "the voting of wise decisions."5 The First
Amendment is understood to protect the communicative processes neces-
sary to disseminate the information and ideas required for citizens to vote
in a fully informed and intelligent way. Meiklejohn analogizes democracy
to a town meeting; the state is imagined as a moderator, regulating and
abridging speech "as the doing of the business under actual conditions may
require."'" For this reason, "abusive" speech, or speech otherwise incon-
sistent with "responsible and regulated discussion," can and should be sup-
pressed. 2 From the Meiklejohnian perspective, "the point of. ultimate
interest is not the words of the speakers, but the minds of the hearers,"53 so
that the First Amendment is seen as safeguarding collective processes of
decision making rather than individual rights. Meiklejohn summarizes this
assumption in a much quoted and influential aphorism: "What is essential
is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be
said."
The alternative account of democracy, which I shall call the
"participatory" theory, does not locate self-governance in mechanisms
of decision making, but rather in the processes through which citizens
come to identify a government as their own.5 According to this theory,
48. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
49. Id. at 96, 101-02.
50. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE 26 (1965). For a full discussion and critique, see Robert Post, Meiklejohn's
Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 1109 (1993).
51. MEIKLFJOHN, supra note 50, at 24.
52. Id. at25.
53. Id. at 26.
54. Id.
55. For a discussion of the contrast, see Post, supra note 50; see also Robert Post, Equality and
Autonony in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REv. 1517, 1523 (1997).
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democracy requires that citizens experience their state as an example of
authentic self-determination. How such an experience can be sustained
presents something of a puzzle, because citizens can expect to disagree
with many of the specific actions of their government. The solution to this
puzzle must be that citizens in a democracy experience their authorship of
the state in ways that are anterior to the making of particular decisions. The
participatory account postulates that it is a necessary precondition for this
experience that a state be structured so as to subordinate its actions to pub-
lic opinion, and that a state be constitutionally prohibited from preventing
its citizens from participating in the communicative processes relevant to
the formation of democratic public opinion. 6
If, following the usage of the Court, we term these communicative
processes "public discourse,"57 then the participatory approach views the
function of the First Amendment to be the safeguarding of public discourse
from regulations that are inconsistent with democratic legitimacy. State
restrictions on public discourse can be inconsistent with democratic legiti-
macy in two distinct ways. To the extent that the state cuts off particular
citizens from participation in public discourse, it pro tanto negates its
claim to democratic legitimacy with respect to such citizens. To the extent
that the state regulates public discourse so as to reflect the values and pri-
orities of some vision of collective identity, it preempts the very demo-
cratic process by which collective identity is to be determined.
Although both the Meiklejohnian and participatory perspectives share
the common problem of specifying which communication is necessary
for self-government and hence worthy of constitutional protection, they
differ in at least two fundamental respects. First, the Meiklejohnian
approach interprets the First Amendment primarily as a shield against the
"mutilation of the thinking process of the community,"58 whereas the par-
ticipatory approach understands the First Amendment instead as safe-
guarding the ability of individual citizens to participate in the formation of
public opinion. The Meiklejohnian theory thus stresses the quality of pub-
lic debate, whereas the participatory perspective emphasizes the autonomy
of individual citizens.
Second, the Meiklejohnian perspective imagines the state within the
arena of public discourse as occupying the position of a neutral moderator,
capable of saving public discourse from "mutilation" by distinguishing
between relevant and irrelevant speech, abusive and non-abusive speech,
high and low value speech, and so forth. It specifically repudiates the
56. For a fully developed explanation of this view, see ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL
DOMAINS 179-96 (1995).
57. Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995); see also Hustler Magazine,
Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46,55 (1988).
58. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 50, at 27 (emphasis deleted).
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notion that public discourse is "a Hyde Park," filled with "unregulated
talkativeness."59 The participatory approach, in contrast, denies that there
can be any possible neutral position within public discourse,.' because
public discourse is precisely the site of political contention about the nature
of collective identity, and it is only by reference to some vision of collec-
tive identity that speech can be categorized as relevant or irrelevant, abu-
sive or not abusive, high or low value. The participatory theory
understands national identity to be endlessly controversial, so that national
identity cannot without contradiction provide grounds for the censorship of
public discourse itself.
In both of these respects, the Meiklejohnian perspective is structurally
quite analogous to the theory of the marketplace of ideas. Both theories
focus primarily on maintaining the integrity of processes of collective
thinking. The Meiklejohnian approach seeks to safeguard the dialogue
necessary for voting wisely; the theory of the marketplace of ideas
seeks to protect the dialogue necessary for advancing truth. Just as Holmes
in his Abrams dissent stressed that in proposing the theory of the
marketplace of ideas he was "speaking only of expressions of opinion and
exhortations,"'" so contemporary Meiklejohnians seek to distinguish
"between cognitive and noncognitive aspects of speech" and to award "less
constitutional protection" to the latter.62 Both theories are keenly aware of
the prerequisites for constructive thinking. Just as Dewey viewed "ridicule,
abuse, [and] intimidation" as incompatible with rational discussion,63 so
Meiklejohn viewed "abusive" speech as incompatible with a well-ordered
town meeting.
IV
RECONCILING FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY AND DOCTRINE
It is therefore particularly significant that our First Amendment tradi-
tion decisively rejects these critical components of both the Meildejohnian
perspective and the theory of the marketplace of ideas. American courts
have consistently opted to protect individual autonomy against regulations
of public discourse designed to maintain the integrity of collective thinking
processes. In the area of campaign finance reform, for example, the
Supreme Court has forcefully asserted that "the concept that government
may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance
the relative voice of others" should be repudiated as "wholly foreign to the
59. Id. at 25-26.
60. As Kenneth Karst once famously remarked, "The state lacks 'moderators' who can be trusted
to know when 'everything worth saying' has been said." Kenneth Karst, Equality as a Central
Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 20,40 (1975).
61. 250U.S.at631.
62. Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 Danca L. 589, 603.
63. Dewey, supra note 42, at 393; see also text accompany note 42.
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First Amendment."' In contexts ranging from restrictions on pornography
and hate speech to "right-of-reply" statutes applicable to newspapers, con-
temporary advocates of the Meiklejohnian position have sharply and con-
tinuously complained of the tendency of courts to extend constitutional
protection to individual rights even when the exercise of such rights
"distorts" public discussion by perpetuating imbalances of social and eco-
61nonic power.
This commitment to individual rights is one of the hallmarks of our
distinctively American free-speech jurisprudence. The one notable excep-
tion to this commitment has been the Court's approval of federal regula-
tions of the broadcast media. These regulations, which were designed to
promote a balanced and well-ordered national dialogue on public issues,
were clearly inspired by Meiklejohnian principles. Before adjudging such
regulations constitutional, however, the Supreme Court took extraordinary
care to characterize broadcast licensees as trustees for the speech of others,
rather than as themselves direct participants in the conduct of self-
governance.66 This characterization enabled the Court to regard the impo-
sition of broadcast regulations as not improperly restricting autonomous
participants in the process of self-determination, and hence as compatible
with the participatory approach.
American free-speech jurisprudence is also unique in its refusal to
permit state restrictions within public discourse of irrational or abusive
speech, or speech otherwise deemed incompatible with rational dialogue.
Beginning with cases like Cantwell v. Connecticut7 and Terminiello v.
Chicago,5 First Amendment decisions have stood foursquare for
the proposition that constitutional protection should be extended to
speech within public discourse that is "outrageous ' or "offensive";7 that
is filled with "exaggeration" or "vilification;" '71 that is "indecent"," that
ruptures the "dignity" of its recipient;73 or that is perceived as an instru-
ment of "aggression and personal assault."'74 According to both the
Meiklejohnian tradition and the theory of the marketplace of ideas, there is
64. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
65. See, e.g., OWEN M. Fiss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES
OF STATE POWER (1996).
66. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1969). Over time, this
characterization of broadcast media has proved historically unstable. For a discussion, see Robert C.
Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151,158-60 (1996).
67. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
68. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
69. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988).
70. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22 (1971).
71. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
72. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 869 (1997).
73. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312,322 (1988).
74. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374,412 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
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little constitutional reason to protect such speech, because it runs so
directly contrary to the prerequisites of constructive thinking.
The participatory approach, by contrast, explains both why such
speech is protected and why this protection is limited. The participatory
approach does not focus on the cognitive cogency of speech, but rather on
its facilitation of democratic participation. Even irrational and abusive
speech can, within particular circumstances, serve as a vehicle for the con-
struction of democratic legitimacy. When irrational and abusive speech
serves this function, which is to say when it is deemed within public dis-
course,' its regulation would both compromise the neutrality of the state
and the autonomy of those participating within public discourse. But when
such speech does not serve this function, which is to say when it is deemed
not within public discourse, it can be and commonly is regulated.76 The
upshot is a uniquely American jurisprudence that displays an overriding
constitutional conviction to interpret the First Amendment "to ensure that
the individual citizen can effectively participate in and contribute to our
republican system of self-government.""
This analysis suggests that where the doctrinal implications of differ-
ent prominent theories of the First Amendment collide, courts will tend to
give priority to the participatory theory of democracy. But this does not
mean that other theories do not continue to have weight and consequence
when they are not inconsistent with the participatory theory. Just as the
marketplace of ideas continues to inform constitutional understandings of
academic freedom, so the Meildejohnian perspective continues to structure
the regulation of speakers like the broadcast media, who are not understood
to be participants in public discourse.
The full force of the participatory theory is most strikingly revealed
when its requirements are contrasted with a regime of speech governed by
a competing theory, like the Meiklejohnian approach. Consider, for exam-
ple, the area of "commercial speech." The Court has never intimated that
commercial speech should receive constitutional protection because par-
ticipation in such speech facilitates democratic legitimacy. Instead the
Court has explained that commercial speech merits First Amendment
75. The boundaries of public discourse are fixed by reference to various factors, including the
content of speech (whether it is about a "public figure" or a matter of "public concern") and the method
of the speech's distribution (whether it was disseminated to the public at large through a "medium for
the communication of ideas"). For a discussion of the nature of these boundaries, see Robert C. Post,
The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARv. L. REv. 601, 667-84 (1990). For a discussion of the concept of
a "medium for the communication of ideas," see Post, supra note 37.
76. For examples of such regulation, see Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 624
(1995); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677-79 (1986); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,461 (1978); Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 565 P.2d 1173 (Wash. 1977).
77. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596,604 (1982).
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concern because it serves an "informational function.... "[T]he free flow
of commercial information," the Court hasoargued, is "indispensable to
the formation of intelligent opinions" necessary for enlightened "public
decisionmaking in a democracy."79
This reasoning represents a classic explication of the Meiklejohnian
tradition. It stresses the cognitive contribution of speech to democratic
decision making, rather than the legitimation-producing effects of speech
understood as a vehicle of participation. The pattern of constitutional pro-
tection that the Court has extended to commercial speech thus follows a
distinctly different pattern than that afforded to public discourse. The Court
has allowed regulations of commercial speech that are necessary to pre-
serve the integrity of its informational function, and hence it has accorded
to commercial speech a "lesser protection."' Commercial speech can be
suppressed if it is "misleading"" or "overreaching" 2 or "intrusive" and
invasive of "privacy."83 Yet because commercial speech is not understood
as a vehicle for participation in the creation of democratic legitimacy, such
regulation is not inconsistent with the participatory approach.
The example of commercial speech suggests that First Amendment
jurisprudence contains several operational and legitimate theories of free-
dom of speech, so that it is quite implausible to aspire to clarify First
Amendment doctrine by abandoning all but one of these theories. In this
short Essay, I have been able to discuss only the most important theories of
the First Amendment, but there are certainly others. Many prominent aca-
demics, for example, have argued that the First Amendment should be
interpreted so as to protect a value known variously as "individual self-
realization,"' "individual self-fulfillment,"'85 or "human liberty,"86 and
occasionally there have been court decisions that seem to be inexplicable
except by reference to some such theory of "individual liberty."'87 But there
are not many such decisions, and so the theory does not seem to be very
powerful.
Sometimes diverse First Amendment theories converge on similar
doctrinal rules. The "clear and present danger test" formulated by Holmes
78. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,563 (1980).
79. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765
(1976).
80. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 426 (1993).
81. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
82. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,461 (1978).
83. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 624 (1995).
84. Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591,593 (1982).
85. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRFssION 6 (1970).
86. C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989).
87. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969). For a useful recent study of the state
of scholarship on this theory of the First Amendment, see Brian C. Murchison, Speech and the Self-
Realization Value, 33 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 443 (1998).
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may well be an example of such an over-determined rule. But sometimes
diverse First Amendment theories will require inconsistent doctrinal
regimes, and when this occurs, courts must decide which theory is to be
given priority. I have argued in this Essay that on the whole courts tend to
give priority to the participatory theory of democracy, so that courts will
not implement the doctrinal implications of other theories when they are
inconsistent with the participatory approach.
The example of commercial speech, however, indicates that courts
will nevertheless feel free to impose the doctrinal implications of other
theories of the First Amendment when they are not inconsistent with the
requirements of the participatory theory. We might generalize this insight
by observing that theories of the First Amendment can be arranged
according to a "lexical priority." When theories conflict with each other,
courts must decide the order in which theories should take precedence. To
say, therefore, that a theory like "individual self-fulfillment" or even the
marketplace of ideas, is not powerful, is to say that it ranks low in this
lexical order, and that it cannot explain many decisions whose outcomes
are not also required by lexically prior theories.
This way of conceptualizing the relationship of doctrine to theory
accepts that we shall always have inconsistent regimes of First Amendment
doctrine. But it also promises that this inconsistency can itself display a
certain kind of order. The rules of the participatory theory will be imposed
when required by that theory; the rules of the Meiklejohnian perspective
will be imposed when required by that perspective and not incompatible
with the participatory theory; the rules of the theory of the marketplace of
ideas will be imposed when required by that theory and not incompatible
with the participatory and Meiklejohnian approaches; and so forth.
The nature of this lexical ordering has been obscured by the tendency
of courts to speak of First Amendment rules as applying to speech gener-
ally, thus systematically effacing the domains of speech actually implicated
by different First Amendment theories. For example, in describing the First
Amendment regime imposed upon commercial speech, the Supreme Court
will remark that "[o]ur jurisprudence has emphasized that 'commercial
speech [enjoys] a limited measure of protection, commensurate with
its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values,' and is
subject to 'modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of
noncommercial expression."'88 By characterizing commercial speech
as subordinate to "noncommercial expression," the Court propagates a pat-
ent falsehood. There are many areas of noncommercial expression that
receive no First Amendment protection at all, as the example of consumer
product warnings illustrates. Thus the Court should instead have said that
88. Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,456 (1978)).
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commercial speech receives less protection than "public discourse,"
thereby making clear that what is really at stake is the priority between the
participatory and the Meiklejohnian theories of the First Amendment.
CONCLUSION
By perennially speaking as though speech were itself the object of
First Amendment doctrine, the Court has promulgated a confusing regime
of conflicting doctrinal rules that cannot possibly mean what they say. This
is the underlying cause of what is now generally acknowledged to be the
sorry state of First Amendment doctrine.8 9 If, as I have suggested, the plu-
rality of legitimate First Amendment theories limits the kind of doctrinal
simplicity and clarity that is constitutionally obtainable, we can neverthe-
less expect courts to specify the lexical priority among First Amendment
theories, as well as to be clear about the domain of speech pertinent to each
theory. If courts can follow these simple prescriptions, we will have come
a long way toward calming the tumultuous sea of First Amendment
doctrine.
89. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727,
785-86 (1996).
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